



All market economies display cyclical
fluctuations in such key economic variables as
unemployment and inflation. These fluctuations
are so pervasive that economists devote consider-
able attention to explaining them. One group of
explanations is known as political business cycle
(PBC) theories. According to PBC theories, delib-
erate efforts by incumbent governments to obtain
re-election are important inducements to eco-
nomic fluctuations.
This Letter contains a critical review of PBC
theories, and concludes with some observations
on new theories that emphasize different factors
leading to economic fluctuations.
Early version
In the late 1970s, William Nordhaus of Yale
University and Duncan MacRae of The Urban
Institute made an early contribution to the
advancement of PBC theories. They described
how an incumbent administration, in an effort
to increase its chances of re-election, tends to
pursue policies that lower the unemployment rate
close to election time. By so doing, it also gener-
ates a temporary inflation. Once elected, the
same administration tends to adopt policies
designed to offset the inflationary effects of its
earlier expansionary policies. Since elections
take place at regular intervals, Nordhaus and
MacRae predicted that the elections caused
cyclical fluctuations in the economy.
This theory has some appealing features. First,
it is based on easily understood incentives on
the part of governments. That is, governments
try to extend their terms in office by gaining
popular support. Second, the theory seems able
to account for the regularity of some economic
fluctuations by associating them with elections.
Nordhaus and MacRae's early PBC theory
makes some important assumptions about the
behavior of voters and the feasibility ofthe infla-
tion and unemployment tradeoff. First, it assumes
that voters have short memories. That is, voters
base their decisions only on the most recent pre-
election boom. They do not recognize govern-
ments' incentives to make the economy look
better, or see the recurring pattern of pre-election
booms and post-election recessions.
Second, this PBC theory depends crucially on
the existence of an exploitable tradeoff between
unemployment and inflation, known as the Phil-
lips curve relationship. The theory assumes that
government policy can repeatedly reduce unem-
ployment at the expense of more inflation later
on. This repetition could happen only if the pub-
lic were never to catch on, since expansionary
government actions, once fully anticipated,
are not likely to affect unemployment.
Critique
The "rational expectations" criticism of Keynes-
ian policy analysis also applies to the PBC the-
ories. The rational expectations school of thought
originated in the early 1970s with Robert Lucas,
Jr. of the University ofChicago and Thomas
Sargent of the Hoover Institution and a Visiting
Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco.
According to the criticism, economic agents
make use ofall available information in making
economic decisions. They also attempt to antici-
pate government policies that affect their inte-
rests. Consequently, government should not be
able to exploit systematically a stable tradeoff
between unemployment and inflation.
In addition to this conceptual criticism,
empirical work by Bennett McCallum of
Carnegie-Mellon University directly tested
the predictions of the PBC theories. McCallum
examined u.s. unemployment data between
1949 and 1974 to see whether the unemployment
rate conformed to a general pattern of being low
prior to elections and high after elections. He
found that the electoral cycle had no significant
effect on the pattern of unemployment rates.
In response to these criticisms, PBC theories have
separated into two distinct groups in the 1980s.
The first group focuses on the effects of divergent
objectives among political parties. The secondMoreover, the view that unanticipated changes
in the money supply affect output and prices has
become less influential recently. Economists have
found that there is not much informational lag
between observing shifts in the money supply
and those in the general price level.
This result could be due to possible lags
between the time the money supply changed
and the time that price changes appeared. How-
ever, such a lag violates the assumptions ofthe
money surprise model. It would make money
supply changes ineffective at influencing short-
term outputbecause a price change would not
immediately accompany a "monetary surprise."
People would have time to overcome their sur-













The pattern does not, however, hold with
regard to inflation. Inflation measured by the
GNP deflator during the Democratic and Re-
publican administrations were 3.1 percent and
4.8 percent for the first halves, and 4.4 percent
and 4.3 percent for the second halves, respec-
tively, for the same sample period. Data on
inflation and output together imply that the
Democratic administrations managed to induce
larger increases in output while generating
smaller inflations.
To assess these predictions, the chart shows the
annual real GNP growth rates for the U.S. from
1947 to 1989. During the period, the average
growth rates of real GNP during the Democratic
and Republican administrations were 4.8 percent
and 1.3 percent for the first halves, and 4.1 per-
cent and 3.8 percent for the second halves,
respectively. These figures seem to support the
view that the first halves of each administration
were markedly different along party lines during
the sample period.
Annual Real GNP Growth




focuses more on the presence of electoral cycles
in governmental budgets.
Alesina and Sachs' reasoning is based on
the economic theory that only unanticipated
changes in the money supply affect the output
ofthe economy. According to this theory, an un-
anticipated change in the money supply creates
a change in the general price level in the same
direction. For example, an unanticipated increase
in the money supply would have raised prices.
Instead of recognizing the general nature of the
price change, producers think that the relative
prices of goods have changed because of a
shift in consumer demand. Their misperception
leads them to alter their output and employment
of labor.
In a paper published in 1988, Alesina and
Sachs described how electoral cycles can be
transmitted to business cycles. According to the
authors, people take future government policies
into consideration while making current eco-
nomic decisions. They do so by forming expecta-
tions about future policy based on an average of
the typical policies of the competing parties. The
actual policies of the elected party will neces-
sarily differ from that "anticipated" policy. The
resulting "surprise;' in theory, would have tem-
porary effects on output.
New partisan theory
The partisan theory derives from the observations
that different political parties in the United States
(Democratic and Republican) and in European
countries (Conservatives and Socialists, among
others) seem to have pursued distinctly different
economic policies while in office. The differ-
ences are most apparent with regard to the rela-
tive emphases on unemployment and inflation.
Recently, Thomas Havrilesky of Duke University,
Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University and Alberto
Alesina of Carnegie-Mellon University, among
others, have advanced this partisan view.
The partisan theory therefore predicts that we
would observe above-trend growth in the supply
of money and output when an expansionary
party takes office, and low growth in the money
supply and output when the less expansionary
party takes office. Also, since the element of
surprise is important, the pattern described
should be more apparent in the first half of
new administrations than in the second half.
FRBSFAlesina and Sachs also concluded that both the
Kennedy and Nixon administrations do not fit
the partisan view ofthe PBC theories. Given that
the entire sample consists offour Republican and
three Democratic administrations between 1949
and 1984, these exceptions are disconcerting.
New budget theory
Since the publication of early work on PBC
theories, some economists have dropped the
focus on the unemployment-inflation tradeoff
in favor of a focus on the effects of budget fi-
nancing. Among others, Kenneth Rogoff of the
University of California at Berkeley and a Visiting
Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco and Anne Sibert ofthe University of Kansas
have focused on budget cycles that result from
deliberate attempts by incumbent governments
to influence the economy in their favor.
A government can finance its budget by a
combination of raising tax revenue and printing
money, assuming that the government controls
the monetary authority. Rogoff and Sibert define
voter preferences for a competent government
in terms of a concern for a government that can
provide services at a smaller cost to the public.
They assume that the public can discern the true
performance of government and the size of
seignorage (the revenue from creating money)
only after a time lag. The incumbent government,
in their view, tries to impress voters near election
time by lowering taxes and increasing spending.
The public, in turn, interprets these actions as
evidence of an effectively operating government.
In sum, incumbent governments have incentives
to finance the budget with relatively less tax
revenue, which voters recognize immediately,
and higher seignorage, which voters do not
identify until after the election. Elections held
at regular intervals would therefore produce
economic cycles.
The budget cycle approach is more plausible
than early PBC theories because it focuses on
policy variables that are under the direct control
of government. However, Rogoff and Sibert may
have defined voter preferences too narrowly.
They do not take into account preferences for
the size of government, or spending priorities
(such as, defense versus social welfare).
Also, their study presupposes the existence of
extensive coordination between the incumbent
administration and the central bank that deter-
mines monetary policy. Such coordination may
occur in countries where the government directly
controls the central bank, but not in the U.S.
where the Federal Reserve is more independent.
Chairman Paul Volcker's pursuit of a disinflation-
ary monetary policy in the early 1980s despite
pressures from the Reagan Administration is
one example.
Monetary policy alone is not central to all
studies of budget cycles, however. Recent studies
by Rogoff focus exclusively on taxation behavior.
Nevertheless, even with regard to taxes, propo-
nents of the budget cycle theory have yet to
establish a firm link to fluctuations in broad
economic activities.
Conclusion
The problems of PBC theories illustrate growing
doubts in macroeconomics about the central role
of fiscal and monetary policies in driving eco-
nomic fluctuations. Real Business Cycle theories
offer a different perspective whose acceptance
is growing.
Real Business Cycle (RBC) theories deny a cen-
tral role to easily identifiable factors, such as the
deliberate actions by governments, in causing
fluctuations in economic activities. According
to the RBC view, prices are flexible enough and
people's expectations, on average, are accurate
enough to mitigate the real effects of policies.
Instead, the theories assign the key role in eco-
nomic fluctuations to the dynamic effects of
individual behavior. They focus on, for example,
how people react to changes in technology over
time, how they change decisions about when to
consume, and how much time to spend at leisure
or at work.
Although not settled yet, the debate over
causes of economic fluctuations has moved
away from the factors central to PBC theories.
The emphasis among economists has shifted
toward an explanation of economic fluctuations
as the equilibrium outcome of a well-functioning
market economy. This contrasts with the expla-
nation that government policies aimed at man-
aging aggregate demand cause fluctuations in
inflation, unemployment, and output.
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